

受 験 番 号					

氏 名	

2018 (平成30) 年度  
放送大学大学院博士後期課程  
文化科学研究科 文化科学専攻

人文学プログラム

筆記試験問題 (英語読解試験)

試験日：2017 (平成29) 年10月7日 (土)  
試験時間：9時30分 ~ 11時30分

注意事項

1. 試験開始の合図があるまで、この試験問題冊子は開かないでください。
2. 解答には、黒鉛筆かシャープペンシルを使用してください。
3. 配付されるものは、「試験問題冊子1冊」「解答用紙2枚」及び「下書き用紙2枚」です。追加配付はしません。
4. 試験開始の合図の後、試験問題冊子を確認してください。試験問題冊子は、表紙、白紙、問題 (3頁)の順に綴じられています。試験問題冊子をとじているホッチキス針をはずしたり、中身を破って取ったりしてはいけません。試験問題冊子または解答用紙に落丁・過不足のある場合、あるいは印刷が不鮮明な場合は、手を挙げて試験監督員の指示に従ってください。
5. 試験問題冊子の所定欄に、受験番号及び氏名を記入してください。
6. 解答用紙の所定欄に、プログラム名、氏名、受験番号及び解答用紙の何枚目であるかを、解答用紙別に必ず記入してください。
7. 解答用紙1枚につき、1,000字まで記入することができます。解答用紙2枚のうち、人文学プログラムは1枚以内で解答してください。指定された字数を超えないよう、注意して解答してください。
8. 試験問題冊子、解答用紙を持ち帰ってはいけません。
9. 試験問題冊子は試験終了後に回収します。試験問題冊子に解答を記入しても採点の対象にはなりませんので、必ず解答用紙に解答を記入してください。
10. 試験時間は2時間です。試験開始から40分を経過した後は、試験問題冊子及び解答用紙を試験監督員に提出した上で退室してもかまいません。ただし、試験終了5分前以降は退室できません。

## 筆記試験問題（英語読解試験）

以下の英文を読み、筆者の主張を 600 字程度の日本語で要約しなさい。

To see how the Hobbesian and the Freudian analyses of the state of nature differ, consider the very concrete example of an arms race. As everyone knows, violence has a tendency to escalate when left unchecked. Military preparations exhibit the same tendency. When stockpiling weapons, the basic goal is to have a larger and more deadly arsenal than another who is likely to attack you. When two countries fear attack from one another, this desire to have more weapons than the other generates a collective action problem. As soon as one country gains any advantage, this just encourages the other to redouble its efforts. Soon the advantage will be eliminated and both countries will be back where they started, except that their level of military expenditure will be higher. Furthermore, since massive investment in weapons spending generates some pressure to use those weapons, such stockpiling can reduce the overall level of security.

Consider the dilemma of a statesman faced with a choice between adopting a ‘high’ or ‘low’ level of military expenditure. Here are the possible outcomes:

- 1 You choose high, your rival chooses low. Security level: high.
- 2 You choose low, your rival chooses low. Security level: medium.
- 3 You choose high, your rival chooses high. Security level: lower.
- 4 You choose low, your rival chooses high. Security level: lowest.

You have a choice between 1 and 2, or between 3 and 4. You will choose a high level of military spending, as will your rival, and so you will wind up with outcome 3. In other words, you wind up spending a lot of money yet getting a lower overall level of security.

But this is only the beginning of the problem. Suppose that you choose a high level of military expenditure and that there is something of a delay before your rival can respond in kind. This means that, for a brief moment, you will enjoy a high level of security (outcome 1). However, as soon as your rivals spending begins to kick in, you will experience a decline in relative security. At this point, rather than accept the inevitable (outcome 3), there is a temptation to escalate the rivalry by choosing to spend even more. This transforms the collective action problem into what is known as a ‘race to the bottom’.

Here the inferiority of the outcome associated with the collective action problem, rather than giving people an incentive to stop what they are doing, gives them an incentive to redouble their efforts, thereby exacerbating the very problem that they were hoping to solve (like when, in order to drown out your neighbour's music, you turn up your own stereo). Eventually, the outcome becomes so bad that both parties are 'locked in' to the conflict – they cannot pull out, simply because the stakes have become too high.

Thus military expenditures have a well-known tendency to degenerate into arms races. The important point about these arms races is that, from the outside, they appear irrational. During the '60s, when the Cold War began in earnest, the logic of these conflicts was not well understood. Thus it was easy to conclude that politicians and military leaders had gone somewhat mad (or that the state had fallen under the sway of the 'military-industrial complex'). Various Freudian analyses of this madness had enormous influence. The arms race was presented as an example of our aggressive instincts overpowering our rational faculties. The 1964 movie *Dr. Strangelove* provided the classic articulation of this view (and drew all of the usual parallels between sexual repressions, German fascism and American nuclear escalation). Building weapons was essentially a form of sublimated aggression. The constant increase in size and payload could be explained as a neurotic reaction to the discipline that military production imposed upon society. The demand for more weapons means more discipline in the factory, more deferred gratification. This increase in psychic repression creates increased aggression, and thus the need for more sublimation – more weapons. The feedback relationship between the two creates the logic of increased escalation, inevitably culminating in nuclear holocaust.

From this Freudian perspective, an arms race reveals something *deep* about human nature. The fact that human beings feel the need to build 100-megaton nuclear bombs shows just how scary our instincts are. It shows that, deep down, to want to use such weapons against one another, we must be extraordinarily violent creatures.

The Hobbesian analysis, on the other hand, denies that arms races reveal any such deep tendencies. It is possible for two countries to get into an arms race even though neither of them has any serious plans to attack the other one; they only need to believe that the other one intends to attack them. It is precisely this lack of trust that triggers the race to the bottom. One country starts stockpiling weapons in order to deter a perceived threat. The other regards this as a threat, and so increases its own level of expenditure. The cycle continues, with each one perceiving the other's defensive move as an offensive one. The

Soviet Union and the United States both claimed, throughout the Cold War, that their preparations were entirely defensive in nature. But since neither believed the other, the lack of aggressive intent did nothing to stop the arms race.

Now that the Cold War is over, it is possible to look back and see that the Hobbesian analysis was essentially correct. If the Freudian analysis had been right, then the Cold War would never have ended (or it certainly would not have ended in the way that it did). Both the Soviet Union and the United States were motivated less by hatred of one another than by fear of each other's intent. All it took to end the conflict was the essentially unilateral decision by Mikhail Gorbachev to call the whole thing off. In so doing, he showed that the arms race was based much less on aggression between the two parties than simply upon a lack of trust.

What can we conclude from all this? Freud argued that civilisation creates unhappiness, by repressing some of our most powerful instincts. What is the evidence that we have such instincts? The evidence is that when you leave people free to do whatever they want, things quickly degenerate into violence. According to Freud, this shows that, at some fundamental level, we are all bloodthirsty creatures. Hobbes proposes a far more simple explanation. People often treat others poorly not because of any desire to inflict suffering, but out of a desire to avoid being treated poorly themselves. It is like the couple who break up not because they do not like each other, but because each believes that the other is about to break things off, and would rather be the 'dumper' than the 'dumpee'. Their problem is simply a lack of trust.

#### Notes

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): English philosopher, known for his original thoughts on the problem of social and political order.

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939): Austrian neurologist and the founder of psychoanalysis.

出典 : Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter, *The Rebel Sell: How the Counterculture Became Consumer Culture* (Capstone, 2005), pp. 87-90 (partly abridged).

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